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Capability ethics 
Ingrid Robeyns 
 
The capability approach is one of the most recent additions to the landscape of 
normative theories in ethics and political philosophy. Yet in its present stage of 
development, the capability approach is not a full-blown normative theory, in 
contrast to utilitarianism, deontological theories, virtue ethics, or pragmatism. As 
I will argue in this chapter, at present the core of the capability approach is an 
account of value, which together with some other (more minor) normative 
commitments adds up to a general normative framework that can be further 
developed in a range of more specific and detailed normative theories. The aim 
of this chapter is both to describe the capability approach, as it has been 
developed so far, as well as briefly exploring how a capabilitarian ethical theory 
could look like if we were to develop it in full.  
So what is the capability approach? In its most general description, the 
capability approach is a flexible and multi-purpose normative framework, rather 
than a precise theory of well-being, freedom. At its core are two normative 
claims: first, that the freedom to achieve well-being is of central moral 
importance, and second, that freedom to achieve well-being is to be understood 
in terms of people’s valuable capabilities, that is, their real opportunities to do 
and be what they have reason to value. This framework can be used for a range 
of evaluative exercises, including most prominent the following: (1) the 
assessment of individual well-being; (2) the evaluation and assessment of social 
arrangements, including assessments of social and distributive justice; and (3) 
the design of policies and proposals about social change in society, which is at 
the core of social ethics. In all these normative endeavors, the capability 
approach prioritizes (a selection of) peoples’ beings and doings and their 
opportunities to realize those beings and doings, for example their genuine 
opportunities to be educated, their ability to move around or to enjoy supportive 
social relationships. This stands in contrast to normative frameworks which 
endorse other accounts of value, like mental states or which focus on 
instrumental values (e.g. resources).  
 
 
1. What are capabilities?  
 
Capabilities are real opportunities, whereby the opportunities do not refer to 
access to resources or opportunities to certain levels of satisfaction, but rather to 
what a person can do and to the various states of being of this person. 
Capabilities refer to both what we are able to do (activities), as well as the kind 
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of person we can be (dimensions or our being). These ‘beings and doings’, that is, 
the various states of human beings and activities that a person can undertake, 
are in the capability approach called ‘(human) functionings’. The term 
‘functionings’ may misleadingly sound like a profound notion, but in essence it 
refers to a very simple idea that we use in common speech, namely aspects or 
states of the human being that we are (‘beings), and the various things we can do 
as human beings that we (‘doings’). Examples of the former (the ‘beings’) are 
being well-nourished, being undernourished, being housed in a pleasantly warm 
but not excessively hot house, being educated, being illiterate, being part of a 
supportive social network, being part of a criminal network, and being 
depressed. Examples of the second group of functionings (the ‘doings’) are 
travelling, caring for a child, voting in an election, taking part in a debate, taking 
drugs, killing animals, eating animals, consuming lots of fuel in order to heat 
one’s house, and donating money to charity.  
Although many scholars who are working with the capabilities approach 
focus exclusively on capabilities that they deem valuable, conceptually the notion 
of ‘functionings’ is in itself morally neutral. Functionings can be univocally good 
(e.g. being in good health) or univocally bad (e.g. being raped). But the goodness 
or badness of various other functionings may not be so straightforward, but 
rather depend on the context and/or the normative theory that we endorse. For 
example, is the care work of a mother who is caring full-time for her child a 
valuable functioning or not? A conservative-communitarian normative theory 
will most likely mark this as a valuable functioning, whereas a feminist-liberal 
theory will only do so if the care work is the result of an autonomous choice 
made against a background of equal opportunities and fair support for those 
who have duties to care for dependents.  
Capabilities are a person’s real freedoms or opportunities to achieve 
functionings. Thus, while travelling is a functioning, the real opportunity to 
travel is the corresponding capability. A person who is not travelling may or may 
not be free and able to travel: the notion of ‘capability’ tries to capture precisely 
this fact of whether the person could travel if she would want to do this.  The 
distinction between functionings and capabilities is between the realized and the 
effectively possible, in other words, between achievements, on the one hand, and 
freedoms or valuable opportunities from which one can choose, on the other. 
The notion of ‘capabilities’ refers to the combination of the external 
conditions of acting or being, as well as the internal conditions. Take for example 
the capability to read. The internal conditions for that capability include having 
decent reading skills, as well as not suffering from debilitating conditions that 
prevent a person from reading (e.g. severe concentration issues or visual health 
problems). The external conditions for that capability are, for example, having 
access to a text that is written in a language one masters, as well as being in the 
right environment and conditions which allow one the time and space to read 
(e.g. not being in a situation of acute physical danger). 
Martha Nussbaum acknowledges the importance of both the internal and 
external conditions explicitly, by working out the conceptual distinction between 
internal capabilities and combined capabilities. Internal capabilities are “the 
characteristics of a person (personality traits, intellectual and emotional 
capacities, states of bodily fitness and health, internalized learning, skills of 
perception and movement)” (Nussbaum 2011a: 21).  Combined capabilities, 
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which in the capability literature are referred to simply as ‘capabilities’, are “not 
just the abilities residing inside a person but also the freedoms or opportunities 
created by a combination of personal abilities and the political, social and 
economic environment” (Ibid, p. 20).  Combined capabilities, or ‘capabilities’ for 
short, are thus the internal capabilities in combination with the relevant external 
conditions.  
Capabilities are often referred to as ‘freedoms’. Yet this can only 
consistently be done if freedoms are understood in a very particular sense, since 
the term ‘freedom’ is used (both in daily speech and in practical philosophy) in a 
range of different ways, many of which are not what is meant by those who 
equate capabilities with freedoms. This is one reason why Nussbaum (2003) is 
critical of calling capabilities freedoms, since it is a language that is often equated 
with the rule of law, formal rights, and similar formal or legal notions. She is 
especially worried that in certain contexts the reference to ‘freedoms’ will lead to 
an understanding of capabilities as implying mere non-interference, whereas the 
protection or enhancement of a person’s capabilities often requires pro-active 
policies. Nussbaum has on a few occasions used the term “substantial freedoms” 
(e.g. 2011a: 21) but generally has preferred the use of the term ‘opportunities’ 
when describing capabilities. 
Sen, in contrast, often equates capabilities with freedoms. Yet as any 
overview on the concept of ‘freedom’ will quickly reveal, ‘freedom’ has many 
different and often conflicting meanings (see e.g. Carter, Kramer and Steiner 
2007).  A careful reading of Sen’s work clarifies that capabilities are freedoms 
conceived as real opportunities (Sen 1985a: 3–4; 1985b: 201; 2002: chapter 20). 
For Sen, capabilities as freedoms refer to the presence of valuable options or 
alternatives, in the sense of opportunities that do not exist only formally or 
legally but are also effectively available to the agent. As Alexander Kaufman 
(2006) has shown, some critiques of Sen’s writings on the capability approach 
are based on a mistaken understanding of the kind of freedom capabilities are. 
Many ethical theories require a metric for interpersonal comparisons.  
According to the capability approach, ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ are the best 
metric for most kinds of interpersonal evaluations. Yet the various versions of 
the capability approach differ in whether they have an underlying theory of 
reasons to value (and if so, which), and whether capabilities are strictly tied to 
people’s well-being. In general, there is very little explicit discussion about these 
issues in the capability approach, which makes situating this theory in the 
landscape of ethical theories tricky. In fact, one could argue that nothing can be 
concluded about the capability approach in general, but that rather each 
particular capability needs to analysed on its own before its theoretical 
properties can be properly described.  
In Sen’s version of the capability approach, interpersonal evaluations 
should be conceptualized in terms of people’s capabilities to function, that is, 
their effective opportunities to undertake actions and activities that they have 
reason to value, and be the person that they have reason to want to be. These 
beings and doings together are held to constitute what makes a life valuable. 
Whereas ‘functionings’ are the proposed conceptualization for interpersonal 
comparisons of (achieved) well-being, ‘capabilities’ are the conceptualization for 
interpersonal comparisons of the freedom to pursue well-being, which Sen calls 
“well-being freedom” (Sen 1992: 40). Sen’s claim is that functionings are 
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constitutive of a person’s being, and an evaluation of well-being has to take the 
form of an assessment of these constituent elements (Sen 1992: 39).  
Sen’s account of the capability approach is deliberately vague and 
ambiguous – in part because he believes the notion of capabilities can be helpful 
for different normative goals. Two points should be noted here. First, Sen has a 
broad and plural approach to ethical evaluation: he holds that there is not a 
single value which is always more important than other values. In particular, he 
argues that we can make a distinction between achieved well-being (reflected in 
a person’s functionings), well-being freedom (reflected in her capabilities), as 
well as achieved agency and agency freedom. Both aspects of agency are for Sen 
very important, and evaluating agency requires the evaluation to go beyond 
functionings and capabilities. As a consequence, Sen holds that a person’s 
functionings and capabilities are not all that matters: she may have certain 
agency goals, which translate into particular commitments which may harm her 
own well-being. For example, a environmental activist or a human rights 
advocate may put at risk their own well-being, yet for Sen there may be good 
reasons why an ethical evaluation should also investigate whether people can 
pursue their agency goals (Sen 1985b).  
The second particular feature of Sen’s capability theory is the role played 
by ‘reasons to value’ in his account. In Sen’s view, we need a process of public 
reasoning in order to find out which capabilities are valuable. Sen (2009: 31-51) 
believes that there cannot be a guarantee that by reasoning we will reach the 
truth, but that this should not prevent us from trying to be as objective as we can. 
While in the context of the capability approach Sen has said little on what the 
theory of reasons is that underlies his claim that the capability approach should 
focus on the capabilities which people have reason to value, he has indicated 
repeatedly that he believes this should be a process of public reasoning. He 
draws on Adam Smith’s notion of the impartial spectator in order to bring in the 
necessary objectivity in public reasoning, since Smith’s method requires us to 
broaden the discussion about reasons beyond the local perspectives and 
interests. Sen (2009: 45) does indeed “take reasoned scrutiny from different 
perspectives to be an essential part of the demands for ethical and political 
convictions”. While a critic may remark that Sen’s writings on the role of ‘reasons 
to value’ in his capabilities theory remain vague and perhaps even ambiguous, a 
defender of Sen would stress that it is a mistake to believe that one can do more 
than outline a procedure, as there is no final account of such reasons to be given.  
Nussbaum’s version of the capability approach has very different 
normative foundations. There is no role for public reasoning in her theory, apart 
from the level of implementing the capability approach in a particular context 
where local people need to be involved in translating the abstract capabilities 
into more specific capabilities that are sensitive to the local particularities. 
Nussbaum has been very clear and explicit for a long time that her capabilities 
approach is a partial theory of social justice: it is defending an account of a 
minimal set of capabilities which all people on earth should be entitled to purely 
on grounds of their humanity. Over time, Nussbaum has developed and defended 
a list of ‘central human capabilities’, entailing the following ten broad categories: 
life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; 
practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control over one’s 
environment (Nussbaum 2006: 76-78).  She believes these ten categories of 
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capabilities would be endorsed by people across cultures and circumstances. In 
other words, Nussbaum claims that the ten categories of capabilities on her list 
of central human capabilities form the object of a Rawlsian overlapping 
consensus: independent of people’s own comprehensive views of the good life, 
all will agree that as members of a common humanity, we owe each other 
minimal levels of these ten capabilities. This would turn Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach into a form of political liberalism, which she believes is the only 
defensible form of liberalism in political philosophy (Nussbaum 2011b). Yet as is 
the case with Sen too, Nussbaum’s work attracts many critics, including many 
who oppose her way of doing philosophy, or who argue that her version of the 
capabilities approach is a form of liberal perfectionism (e.g. Barclay 2003).  
While Sen and Nussbaum ultimately develop very different versions of 
the capability approach, which are based on quite different ethical foundations 
and are ultimately based on conflicting views of what a theory can and ought to 
do, they do of course also share some common theoretical ground. One 
important aspect which all capability theories share, is the idea that functionings 
are constitutive for human beings.  To say that functionings are constitutive of a 
person’s being means that one cannot be a human being without having at least a 
range of functionings: they make the lives of human beings both lives (in 
contrast to the existence of innate objects) and also human (in contrast to the 
lives of trees or termites). Human functionings are those beings and doings that 
we take to constitute a human life, and which are central in our understandings 
of ourselves as human beings. This implies that the range of potentially relevant 
functionings is very broad, and that the capability approach will in some respects 
be close to both subjective metrics (for example, by including the capability to be 
happy), or resources-based metrics (since most functionings require some 
resources as inputs).  Yet not all beings and doings are functionings; for example, 
being able to fly like a bird or reaching an age of 200 like an oak tree, are not 
human functionings.  
Thus, according to the capability approach, the ends of well-being 
freedom, and development should be conceptualized in terms of people’s 
capabilities. Moreover, what is relevant is not only which opportunities are open 
to me each by themselves, hence in a piecemeal way, but rather which coverall 
real opportunities I have in life – in technical terms: which combinations or sets 
of potential functionings are available to me. For example, suppose I am a low-
skilled poor single parent who lives in a society without decent social provisions. 
Take the following functionings: (1) to hold a job, which will require me to spend 
many hours working and commuting, but will generate the income needed to 
properly feed myself and my family; (2) to care for my children at home and give 
them all the attention, care and supervision they need. In a piecemeal analysis, 
both (1) and (2) are opportunities open to me, but they are not both together 
open to me. The point about the capability approach is precisely that we must 
take a comprehensive or holistic approach, and ask which sets of capabilities are 
open to me, that is: can I simultaneously provide for my family and properly care 
for and supervise my children? Or am I rather forced to make some hard, 
perhaps even tragic choices between two functionings which both reflect basic 
needs and basic moral duties?  
Note that while most types of capability analysis require interpersonal 
comparisons, one could also use the capability approach to evaluate the well-
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being or well-being freedom of one person at one point in time (e.g. evaluate her 
situation against a capability-yardstick), or to evaluate the changes in her well-
being or well-being freedom over time. The capability approach could thus also 
be used by a single individual in her deliberate decision-making or evaluation 
processes, but these types of uses of the capability approach are much less 
prevalent in the philosophical literature, let alone in the social sciences.  
In development ethics, or in ethical theories that propose to deal with 
poverty issues, the notion of ‘basic capabilities’ may play an important role too.  
The term ‘basic capabilities’ refers to a threshold level for the relevant 
capabilities. A basic capability is “the ability to satisfy certain elementary and 
crucially important functionings up to certain levels” (Sen 1992: 45 n. 19). Basic 
capabilities refer to the freedom to do some basic things considered necessary 
for survival and to avoid or escape poverty or other serious deprivations. The 
relevance of basic capabilities is “not so much in ranking living standards, but in 
deciding on a cut-off point for the purpose of assessing poverty and deprivation” 
(Sen 1987: 109). However, while this is the most widespread use in the present 
development of the capability approach, Martha Nussbaum (2000: 84) uses the 
term ‘basic capabilities’ to refer to “the innate equipment of individuals that is 
necessary for developing the more advanced capabilities”, such as the capability 
of speech and language, which is present in a newborn but needs to be fostered. 
The lesson to take home for the student of the capability approach who delves 
into the primary texts is that not all capability scholars are using the exact same 
terminology. There are differences between the terms used by Amartya Sen and 
Martha Nussbaum, but there are also differences between the various disciplines 
and subdisciplines in which the capability approach is being developed.  
 
 
2. The importance of human diversity 
 
A deep acknowledgement of human diversity is one of the key theoretical 
characteristics of the capability approach. Its criticism of other normative 
approaches is often fueled by, and based on, the claim that the full human 
diversity among people is insufficiently acknowledged in many normative 
theories, such as theories of distributive justice. This also explains why the 
capability approach is often favorably regarded by feminist philosophers, or 
philosophers concerned with care and disability issues, since one of their main 
complaints about mainstream moral philosophy has precisely been the relative 
invisibility of the fate of those people whose lives did not correspond to that of 
an able-bodied, non-dependent, careduties-free individual who belongs to the 
dominant ethnic, racial and religious group.  People of minority ethnicities, 
marginalized people, the disabled and many women do not fit that picture.  
Where does this concern for human diversity manifests itself in the 
structure of the capability approach? The first and most obvious aspect of the 
capability approach that reveals its concern for human diversity is that the 
approach in general focuses on all functionings that are relevant and of value – 
and that generally tends to be a wide range of dimensions. Compared with 
normative theories that include a metric of value, it tends to focus on a broader 
range of goods, thereby often including dimensions that are particularly 
important for some groups, but not for others.  Hence, when thinking for 
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example about the good life and a decent or just society, issues of care and 
dependency will be central to the ethical assessment, which is often not the case 
in mainstream ethics or normative political philosophy.  
Secondly, human diversity plays a crucial role in the reason why the 
capability approach focused on capabilities and functionings rather than 
resources. The capability approach argues that our evaluations and acts should 
start from what has ultimate value (which it holds to be capabilities), and only in 
a second step of the analysis ask what means (broadly defined) are needed to 
secure these capabilities. This implies that the capability approach evaluates 
policies and other changes according to their impact on people’s capabilities as 
well as their actual functionings. It asks whether people are able to be healthy, 
and whether the means or resources necessary for this capability, such as clean 
water, adequate sanitation, access to doctors, protection from infections and 
diseases, and basic knowledge on health issues, are present. It asks whether 
people are well-nourished, and whether the means or conditions for the 
realization of this capability, such as having sufficient food supplies and food 
entitlements, are being met. It asks whether people have access to a high-quality 
education system, to real political participation, and to community activities that 
support them, that enable them to cope with struggles in daily life, and that 
foster caring and warm friendships.  
Apart from the fact that capability scholars (in line with most moral 
philosophers but not with the practice of many economists and policy makers) 
believe that one should start any ethical analysis from what really matters 
(rather than from the means to those goods), human diversity is the main reason 
to focus on ends (capabilities) rather than means. The reason is that people differ 
dramatically in their ability to convert resources into valuable functionings. That 
implies that, as a matter of public policy and social ethics, creating capabilities 
will require different actions for different groups of people. People are unique in 
their personal characteristics, and in how they fare in the communities and 
environment in which they are embedded and located. Some of these factors 
which create inter-individual diversity are body-related, others of which are 
shared with all people from her community, and still others of which are shared 
with people with the same social characteristics (e.g. same gender or class or 
race characteristics).  If we want to give a child with autism maximal chances to 
achieve a valuable set of capabilities, then he will need a teacher with different 
skills and knowledge, and a different school setting (e.g. smaller class-size) when 
compared with a neuro-typical child.  Similarly, a man wanting to work as a 
childminder may, given existing gender norms which discriminate against men 
working with infants, need more social support in order to be able to do the 
work he wants to do then a woman. Simply giving the child with autism access to 
public schooling made for neurotypical children, or the male childminder access 
to a gendered labour market, will not be enough in order to secure that all have 
the same capabilities to access. Capability scholars believe that these inter-
individual differences are far-reaching and significant, and that normative 
theories that focus on means tend to downplay their normative relevance (such 
theories are perhaps particularly dominant in political ethics or normative 
political philosophy).  
Yet one could wonder to what extent the capability approach does make a 
relevant difference for ethical analysis, compared to equality of opportunity 
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theories, or to theories that focus on resources. I will briefly look at both 
alternatives in turn.  
First, wouldn’t it be better to focus on means only, rather than making the 
normative analysis more complicated and more informationally demanding by 
also focusing on functionings and capabilities? (e.g. Pogge 2002). Capability 
scholars would respond that starting a normative analysis from the ends rather 
than means has at least two advantages, apart from the earlier mentioned 
fundamental reason that a focus on ends is needed to appropriately capture 
inter-individual differences. First, the valuation of means will retain the status of 
an instrumental valuation rather than take on the nature of an intrinsic 
valuation. For example, money or economic growth will not be valued for their 
own sake, but only in so far as they contribute to an expansion of people’s 
capabilities. Second, by starting from ends, we do not a priori assume that there 
is only one overridingly important means to that ends (such as income), but 
rather explicitly ask the question which types of means are important for the 
fostering and nurturing of a particular capability, or set of capabilities. For some 
capabilities, the most important means will indeed be financial resources and 
economic production, but for others it may be particular political practices and 
institutions, such as effective guarantees and protections of freedom of thought, 
political participation, social or cultural practices, social structures, social 
institutions, public goods, social norms, and traditions and habits. As a 
consequence, an effective capability-enhancing policy may not exist in increasing 
disposable income, but rather fighting a homophobic, ethnophobic, racist or 
sexist social climate.  
A second alternative framework, which could also claim to pay a lot of 
attention to human diversity, are sophisticated equality of opportunity theories. 
Ronald Dworkin (2002:  299-303) has argued that the capabilities approach, 
when disambiguated, collapses into something very similar to an equality of 
opportunity theory. Similarly, the differences with John Rawls principles of 
justice have also been analysed. More detailed analysis has shown that the 
differences between the specific normative principles defended by these theories 
are small, both when analysed in general terms as well as for particular 
problems such as health, disabilities education or gender issues (Brighouse and 
Robeyns (eds, 2010): Pierik and Robeyns 2007; Williams 2002). 
Yet there are significant differences at the meta-theoretical level, since the 
capability approach is less committed to a number of specifications that are 
needed to turn a broad and arguable somewhat vague normative commitment 
idea into a well-defined theory: it’s only firm normative commitment is to 
functionings and capabilities as the relevant evaluative space. Equality of 
opportunity theories either have certain background assumptions that turn them 
into ideals that hold only under idealizing circumstances, or they have a much 
more restricted theoretical scope, such as being limited to people in their 
capacity as citizens only, or only to people who have the cognitive capacities 
needed for practical reasoning. In addition, there are also differences in terms of 
the grounding of those theories, and to the basic ethical intuitions from which 
they start. In sum, the capability approach can properly be regarded as one 
version of an opportunity theory (after all, capabilities are opportunity-
freedoms), but it remains a more open framework with fewer specifications, and 
with in general no commitment to restrictions on scope (yet more specific 
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capabilitarian theories may include such a commitment). Moreover, the 
capability approach stresses the important aspect of analyzing all relevant areas 
of life, hence endorsing what some would prefer to call a holistic viewpoint. This 
implies means that it would reject an analysis that only looks at opportunities in 
one sphere of life, but would rather ask how a certain act or social institution 
affects the quality of people’s lives and their freedom to having a high quality of 
life in all relevant domains.  
 
 
3. Specifying the capability approach 
 
The capability approach defends a specific view of ultimate value, by 
conceptualizing a metric of well-being (in terms of functionings) and well-being 
freedom (in terms of capabilities). However, clearly this still leaves open a range 
of very different capability theories to emerge from these metrics. These theories 
will differ regarding their purpose (e.g. a capabilitarian theory of ethics, or a 
capabilitarian theory of global justice) but they will also differ regarding their 
specifications, which are needed in case we want a theory that gives precise 
answers to the questions what actions we ought to take.  
In the capability literature, it is generally accepted that at least three 
specifications are needed. First, is the appropriate focus functionings, or rather 
capabilities? Second, how are we to select and aggregate the multiple dimensions 
of the capability approach? And finally, since the capability approach only 
defends the informational space in which interpersonal comparisons need to be 
conducted, what else is needed for a full capability theory of justice to be 
developed? In what follows each will be discussed briefly; a more elaborate 
discussion, including considerations that are of less relevance for ethical theory 
but more to the capability approach in the social sciences, can be found in 
Robeyns (2011).  
 
 
3.1 Functionings or capabilities? 
 
Scholars interested in the capability approach have debated whether the 
appropriate well-being metric should be capabilities or functionings, hence 
opportunities or achievements. What considerations have been argued to be 
relevant for this choice?  
The first consideration is normative, and this is the argument Sen and 
Nussbaum most often offer: by focusing on capabilities rather than functionings, 
we do not privilege a particular account of good lives but instead aim at a range 
of possible ways of life from which each person can choose. Thus, it is the liberal 
nature of the capability approach, or an anti-paternalist consideration, that 
motivates a principled choice for capabilities rather than functionings. Obviously, 
the strength of this argument depends on how bad one takes paternalism to be. 
There may be good reasons to believe that some paternalism is unavoidable, or 
even desired (Nussbaum 2000: 51-56). Moreover, many would hold that there is 
most likely some paternalism in the selection of capabilities anyway. 
A second normative consideration stems from the importance given to 
personal responsibility in contemporary political philosophy. If one believes that 
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one should strive for equality of capability (as some but not all capability 
scholars do since some would rather defend a sufficientarian capability view, 
which holds that threshold levels of capabilities need to be met for all people, but 
beyond those thresholds inequalities are morally permissible), then each person 
should have the same real opportunity (set of capabilities), but once that is in 
place, each individual should be held responsible for his or her own choices. This 
responsibility-sensitivity principle is widely endorsed not only in political 
philosophy but also in the mathematical models being developed in normative 
welfare economics. If one wants to endorse and implement this principle of 
responsibility-sensitivity, then specifications and applications of the capability 
approach should focus on capabilities, rather than functionings. Yet many 
philosophers disagree on whether we should endorse responsibility-sensitivity 
in developing the capability approach (e.g., Fleurbaey 2002; Vallentyne 2005; 
Wolff and de-Shalit 2007). Moreover, for applied ethical analysis, serious 
epistemological hurdles may ultimately lead us to drop the responsibility-
sensitive principle for practical reasoning about the actual world.  
Third, there are cases in which a capability is available to a person but 
only if other people do not also want to realize that capability (Basu 1987: 74). 
For example, two spouses may each have the capability of holding demanding 
jobs which are each on their own incompatible with large caring responsibilities. 
However, if these spouses also have infants or relatives with extensive care 
needs, then at best only one of them may effectively realize that capability. Since 
capability sets may therefore include freedoms that are conditional (because 
they depend on the choices of other people), it might be better to focus both on 
the individual’s capability set and also on what people have been able to realize 
from their own capability sets, that is, their functionings or well-being 
achievements. The question of who decides or should decide this sort of spousal 
question highlights the importance of agency and procedural fairness, which are 
generally taken to be part of the capability approach in its broader use (Crocker 
2008).  
It should also be mentioned that the concept of functioning has particular 
relevance for our relations to those human beings who are not yet able to choose 
(infants), who will never be able to choose (severely mentally disabled 
individuals), or who have lost this ability through advanced dementia or serious 
brain damage. Whether or not these persons can decide to be well nourished and 
healthy, it is generally held that we (through families, governments, or other 
institutions) have the moral obligation to promote or protect their nutritional 
and healthy functioning.  
 
 
3.2 Selecting and aggregating of capabilities? 
 
Other major points of debate in the capability literature are the questions of 
which capabilities should be selected as relevant and who should decide (or how 
a decision should be made) on the aggregation of the various dimensions into an 
overall assessment. At the level of ideal theories of justice, some have argued 
that each and every capability is relevant and should count in our moral calculus 
(Vallentyne 2005). Others have argued that considerations of justice require that 
we demarcate morally relevant from morally irrelevant and morally bad 
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capabilities (Nussbaum 2003; Pogge 2002; Pierik and Robeyns 2007). This 
demarcation could be done in various ways, and most capability scholars think 
that different answers are appropriate in different normative exercises. In other 
words, the selection of relevant capabilities would be different when the 
question is how to arrange a society’s basic structure, versus when the question 
is how to spend the donations Oxfam has collected, or when the normative 
question is how to raise one’s child. Anderson (1999) argues that, for purposes 
of political justice, the only relevant capabilities are those needed for a person to 
participate as a citizen. Nussbaum endorses a well-defined list of capabilities, 
which, she argues, should be enshrined in every country’s constitution 
(Nussbaum 2000, 2003, 2006). Her list contains the earlier mentioned ten 
central human capabilities: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, 
imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; 
play; and control over one’s environment. Nussbaum (2000: 70-77; 2006: 78-81) 
justifies this list by arguing that each of these capabilities is needed in order for a 
human life to be “not so impoverished that it is not worthy of the dignity of a 
human being” (2000: 72). She defends these capabilities as being the moral 
entitlements of every human being on earth. She formulates the list at an 
abstract level and advocates that the translation to implementation and policies 
should be done at a local level, taking into account local differences. However, 
Nussbaum is crystal clear that her project is only the formulation of a partial 
theory of political justice, and hence it is not obvious at all that the same list can 
be used for other normative projects, nor that the justification she offers for her 
list can be transposed.  
Sen consistently and explicitly refuses to defend “one pre-determined 
canonical list of capabilities, chosen by theorists without any general social 
discussion or public reasoning” (Sen 2005: 158). Of course, groups and theorists 
might construct lists for various purposes, and lists need not be “pre-
determined” or “canonical,” however we might understand these terms. And 
Sen’s refusal to endorse Nussbaum’s list has not prevented him from using – for 
various purposes – particular selections of capabilities in his empirical as well as 
his normative work. However, beyond stating in general terms that some 
democratic process and public reasoning should be involved, Sen has never 
explained in detail how such a selection could and should be done. Several 
capability scholars, including Anderson, Alkire, Robeyns, and Crocker, have 
sought in various ways to fill this lacuna. Anderson (1999: 316) argues that 
people should be entitled “to whatever capabilities are necessary to enable them 
to avoid or escape entanglement in oppressive social relationships” and “to the 
capabilities necessary for functioning as an equal citizen in a democratic state.” 
Alkire (2002: chapter 2) proposes to select capabilities based on John Finnis’s 
practical reasoning approach. By iteratively asking “Why do I do what I do?”, one 
comes to the most basic reasons for acting: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic 
experience, sociability (friendship), practical reasonableness, and religion. 
Robeyns (2003) has proposed some pragmatic criteria, mainly relevant for 
empirical research, for the selection of capabilities for the context of inequality 
and well-being assessments. Crocker (2008: chapters 9–10) explores the theory 
and practice of deliberative democracy to bring more specificity to democratic 
procedures and participatory institutions in the development of an agency-
sensitive capability approach. 
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What about weighting different capabilities to come to an aggregate 
evaluation? If we have a list of relevant capabilities, we would still be left 
wondering whether the capabilities should be aggregated and, if so, what their 
relative weights and the formula to aggregate them will or should be. A closely 
related question is how different capabilities should be traded off against one 
another when they cannot all be realized fully. Some have argued against trade-
offs on the basis that the different capabilities are incommensurable or that each 
capability is an absolute entitlement that never should be overridden by another 
entitlement or other normative consideration. For example, Nussbaum argues 
that the ten capabilities on her list, being incommensurable, cannot be traded off 
against one another (and, hence, have no relative weights), and also that the 
state should provide each citizen with a minimum threshold of each capability. 
One possible system of weighting or aggregating is to use a democratic or 
some other social choice procedure (Chakraborty 1996). The basic idea would be 
to encourage or prescribe that the relevant group of people decide on the 
weights. In some contexts, such as small-scale projects or evaluations, such 
capability weighting (and selection) could be done by participatory techniques. It 
has also been suggested that we may determine the weights of capabilities as a 
function of how much they contribute to overall life satisfaction or happiness 
(Schokkaert 2007). Yet this raises the question to what extent functionings are 
taken to be merely instrumental to another end, such as happiness, or indeed 
any other ultimate good or ideal. 
Much of the existing literature refers to the issue of ‘weighting’, but this is 
only one particular form of the more general ‘aggregating’, since aggregation 
may take a different functional form than simply adding up. For example, if you 
have no food, your other capabilities will be worth very little. Some capabilities 
may thus be complementary capabilities, implying that their value to a person 
depends on the presence (or absence) of others. (Note the similarity with the 
notion of ‘complementary goods’ in consumer theory in economics, where it is 
argued that the utility of some goods is dependent on the quantity of some other 
goods, as in the case of pencils and erasers, or shoe polish and shoes of the same 
color). 
 
3.3 Towards a more complete capability theory  
 
The capability approach is often wrongly taken to be an egalitarian theory or a 
theory of social or distributive justice. This reading is mistaken, even though it is 
entirely understandable given the specific debates in which the main 
philosophers defend this approach. The capability approach specifies what 
should count for interpersonal evaluations and thus provides an important 
aspect of a theory of social or distributive justice, or a normative ethical theory, 
yet more is needed. This implies that the capability approach can be an 
egalitarian theory, but can also be a sufficientarian theory; at the highly general 
level at which the capability approach is pitched, all these more specific theories 
can be developed.  
Within the capability approach, most work has been done in political 
philosophy, on developing the capability approach into a more detailed theory of 
social justice. Nussbaum’s work comes closest to offering us a capability theory 
of justice, but her theory too doesn’t amount to a full theory of social justice. 
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Nussbaum’s theory of social justice is comprehensive, in the sense that it is not 
limited to an account of political justice, or to liberal democracies. Rather, her 
account holds for all human beings on earth, independently of whether they are 
living in a liberal democratic regime, or of whether they are severely disabled. 
The main demarcation of Nussbaum’s account is that it provides only “a partial 
and minimal account of social justice” (Nussbaum 2006: 71) by specifying 
thresholds of a list of capabilities that governments in all nations should 
guarantee to their citizens. Nussbaum’s theory focuses on thresholds, but this 
does not imply that reaching these thresholds is all that matters for social justice; 
rather, her theory is partial and simply leaves unaddressed the question what 
social justice requires once those thresholds are met. 
Moreover, it would be a mistake to think that there can be only one 
capability theory of justice; on the contrary, the open nature of the capability 
approach allows for the development of a family of capability theories of justice. 
But this prompts the question: what is needed to develop a full capability theory 
of justice, and which of these aspects have already been developed by theorists 
of justice? And what is needed for a convincing and plausible capabilitarian 
ethical theory? Since on that last question very little work has been done so far, I 
will develop some first thoughts in the last section of this paper. On the question 
what is needed for a plausible and complete capability theory of justice to 
emerge, see Robeyns (2011). 
 
 
4. Capabilities and rights  
 
The notion of rights plays a central role in practical philosophy, but also in our 
daily lives. As Nussbaum (1977: 273) has pointed out, “the language of rights has 
a moral resonance that makes it hard to avoid in contemporary discourse”. 
Hence there is a strategic reason to ask how capabilities relate to rights. But, 
more importantly, there is also a theoretical reason, as several capability 
theories express their claims in terms of people’s individual entitlements. 
Nussbaum has most explicitly described her own version of the capabilities 
approach in terms of universal entitlements, and has also argued that she sees 
her capabilities theory as a species of the human rights theory. Yet clearly rights 
are a different moral category then capabilities: how are we then to understand 
their relation? 
 Capability scholars have tended to be critical of the notion of rights, yet 
have also seen the moral, political and rhetorical power of rights. The challenge 
is therefore to give rights a place in a capability ethics that makes that theory 
stronger. Why have capability scholars been critical of the notion of rights? One 
important risk in the rights discourse lies in the danger to conflate moral rights 
with legal rights. Capability ethics would have no problem with granting people 
moral rights to certain capabilities (possibly up to a certain level), as part of a 
more in detail specified capabilitarian theory. Yet the rights discourse runs the 
risk of overemphasizing the legal aspects of rights. The core ethical commitment 
of the capability approach is to secure certain freedoms and access to a certain 
level of quality of life to all (to the extent that this is feasible). Capabilities are 
thereby the ends, and rights are one of the possible means. But rights may not be 
enough to secure those ends, and other means may be needed in order to give 
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people genuine access to capabilities. For example, if certain groups of people 
suffer from stigma or a societal taboo – as is the case with some disabilities – 
then rights alone will not be enough for those people with those disabilities to be 
able to fully participate in social life and hence have access to some centrally 
important capabilities. Social strategies to reduce or even eliminate stigma may 
therefore be a much needed complement to the granting of rights in order for 
people to be fully able to flourish. This example also raises the question who 
holds the corresponding duties to secure rights, and who holds the duties to 
ensure those other additional measures, such as breaking down the stigma. 
There is a risk with a legal rights discourse that it may induce policy makers to 
being contented when they have strictly followed the rules that a limited 
interpretation of the rights imposes on them, even when additional efforts are 
necessary to meeting the goal that underlies the right. And the additional 
capabilities-enhancing measures that are needed to complement rights may not 
always be seen as within the legitimate scope of government intervention, and 
hence we need non-state actors to deliver those, such as civil society groups or 
religious organizations. 
How should we characterize the role of rights within capability ethics? 
Rights clearly are important in daily discourse. However, at the theoretical level, 
rights are always rights to something. Clearly, capability ethics would want 
rights to target capabilities. This is also how some have believed that the 
capability approach can best be understood. For example, Harry Brighouse 
(2004: 80) writes, “it is more illuminating to think of capabilities as the bases of 
rights claims. If someone claims that there is a fundamental right to X, it is 
incumbent on them to justify it; and justification will proceed by showing how 
the right to X is required to serve some capability. If there is no capability that it 
serves, then it is not a fundamental right.”  
 But understanding rights as capability-rights still leaves several 
important options open. One important question is whether such a rights-
supported capabilities ethic will be consequentialist or deontological. If rights 
are seen as mere instruments to serve the expansion of capabilities, then we will 
end up with a capability ethics that is consequentialist in nature. Such a theory 
could easily supplement rights with other instruments aimed at expanding 
capabilities (e.g calling upon people’s voluntary contributions), since the rights 
have a purely instrumental role.  
 However, if (some) capability rights are regarded as side-constraints that 
cannot be violated no matter what, then we are entering the terrain of 
deontological theories. This seems to be how Nussbaum (1997: 300) 
understands her capabilities theory: “… a list of human rights typically functions 
as a system of side-constraints in international deliberation and in internal 
policy debates. That is, we typically say to and of governments, let them pursue 
the social good as they conceive it, so long as they do not violate the items on the 
list. I think this is a very good way of thinking about the way a list of basic human 
rights should function in a pluralistic society, and … I regard my list of basic 
capabilities this way, as a list of very urgent items that should be secured to 
people no matter what else we pursue.” Yet despite Nussbaum’s repeated 
reference of her list as a species of the human rights approach, there remain 
many unresolved conceptual questions to answer regarding capability rights. 
Bernard Williams (1987: 100) has been one of the first moral 
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philosophers to point out the need for a careful conceptual and theoretical 
analysis of the relationship between rights and capabilities. Clearly some 
progress has been made (e.g. Vizard 2006; van Hees, forthcoming) but this is 
another area where much more work is needed if we want to develop a mature 
capabilitarian ethics.  
 
5. An alternative to utilitarianism? 
 
The capability approach explicitly aims at providing an alternative to normative 
views that determine right and wrong simply by judging people’s respective 
mental states (happiness, pain, etc.). This theme was present in Sen’s launching 
of the capability approach in his 1979 Tanner Lectures (Sen 1980), and can be 
seen as an important move in the development of the capability approach 
(Qizilbash 2008: 54). Sen (1999: 59) characterizes welfarist theories as those 
consequentialist theories that restrict “the judgments of states of affairs to the 
utilities in the respective states (paying no direct attention to such things as the 
fulfillment or violation of rights, duties, and so on)”. He rejects such theories 
because, whatever their further specifications, they rely exclusively on utility and 
thus exclude nonutility information from our moral judgments (Sen 1999: 62).  
Sen is concerned not only with the information that is included in a 
normative evaluation, but also with the information that is excluded. The 
nonutility information that is excluded by utilitarianism includes a person’s 
additional physical needs, due to being physically disabled for example, but also 
social or moral principles, such as human rights or the specific principle that 
men and women should be paid the same wage for the same work. For a 
utilitarian, these features of life and these principles have no intrinsic value. Men 
and women, for example, should not be paid the same wage as long as women 
are satisfied with lower wages or total utility is maximized. But Sen believes it 
mistaken to think that such egalitarian and other moral principles should not be 
taken directly into account in our moral judgments. However, note that is a 
matter of philosophical dispute whether a moral defense of basic liberties can 
consistently and convincingly be derived from a capabilities theory; Henry 
Richardson (2007) has argued that the idea of capabilities cannot well capture 
the social, institutional and deontic aspects of basic liberties. If Richardson is 
right, then the capability approach may, perhaps, have a valid critique on the 
blind spots of utilitarianism, but not the answer of how to rectify this.   
Thus the normative theories that Sen attacks include those that rely 
exclusively on mental states. This does not mean that Sen thinks that mental 
states, such as happiness, are unimportant and have no role to play, for they too 
are functionings that we sometimes have reason to value. Rather, it is the 
exclusive reliance on mental states that he rejects. 
One could question whether the attack of Sen and some other capability 
scholars on utilitarianism is as successful as it may seem to them. One worry is 
that capability scholars attack the most simplified version of utilitarianism, or 
that they exaggerate the difference between (some versions of) utilitarianism 
and the capability approach. Based on a reading of J.S. Mill’s work, Qizilbash 
(2008: 58) concludes that “the strong contrast which Sen sometimes makes 
between classical utilitarianism and his capability view is overdone.” Are all 
versions of utilitarianism vulnerable to the capability critiques? 
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Note that a capability ethics which endorses a list of capabilities as 
fundamental human rights which function as side-constraints, will use the 
typical role that rights as side-constraints play in making an anti-utilitarian point 
(Nussbaum 1997: 300). Given that capabilitarian theories can, but need not, 
endorse capability rights as side constraints, the conclusion must be that some 
capabilitarian theories will be further removed from utilitarianism than others.  
 
 
6. Towards an ethical theory 
 
A claim that has recurred repeatedly throughout this chapter, is that the 
capability approach is clearly a normative framework, but at its current stage of 
development has not yet been developed into a proper ethical theory. If one 
were to undertake that project, what would a capabilitarian ethical theory look 
like? In this final section I am to give a brief sketch of what such a theory would 
look like. What follows will not answer all the questions we will have to face 
when developing a full-blown theory, but it will give us at least a better sense of 
the rough nature and shape of a capability ethical theory.  
Most standard accounts of ethical theory, at least in so far as we are 
concerned with our actions and choices rather than the formation of character, 
generally stipulate that ethical theory consists of two parts: 
(1) the theory of value or the theory of the good, which specifies which 
states of affairs are intrinsically good and which are intrinsically bad. 
(2) the theory of the right that specifies which actions are right and which 
are wrong.  
Ethical theories also (tend to) specify the relationship between ‘the good’ and 
‘the right’.  
Can we apply this basic terminology to characterize the capabilities 
approach? Yes, we can. My proposal is to understand the capability approach as 
an incomplete ethical theory, consisting of the following elements three major 
elements.  
The first major characteristic of the capabilitarian ethical theory is that it 
offers an incomplete and underspecified theory of value. However, while it is 
incomplete and underspecified, as was argued throughout this chapter, it does 
entails the following four more precise and specific claims (1A-D). 
Claim 1A: Functionings and capabilities form the ‘evaluative space’. 
Functionings, or capabilities, or a combination of both, have ultimate value. They 
are the most important aspect of our account of value, and the account of value is 
itself very weighty in our overall ethical judgment. This proposition points to the 
first underspecification of the capabilities approach: when using the approach to 
develop a theory that should have teeth, we need to decide whether we think 
only capabilities matter, or only functionings, or a combination of both – and for 
the latter, which combination of functionings and capabilities. 
Claim 1B: Not all functionings are positively valuable. Some functionings 
have a negative value (Nussbaum 2003), e.g. the functioning of being affected by 
a painful, debilitating and ultimately incurable illness, or persistently being 
lonely. 
Claim 1C: Functionings and capabilities are morally neutral categories, and 
we need to distinguish between normatively relevant and normatively irrelevant 
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capabilities (Nussbaum 2003, 2011a; Robeyns 2003, 2011). The capability 
approach, at least in the version that Sen defends’ entails a normative claim, 
namely that we should focus on capabilities that people have reason to value; yet 
the not all capabilities are valuable. There are many beings and doings that have 
negative value (e.g. being raped), that have neither positive nor negative value 
(the capability to be able to choose between another type of virtually identical 
washing powder), or that may be valuable for some ethical purposes, but not for 
others (e.g. in discussions on what the global rich owe to the global poor, we 
would not argue that we should be concerned with undernourished children’s 
capability to go to the cinema; yet when we think about relative poverty in a 
western-european country, one could plausibly argue that never being able to go 
to the cinema can be taken to be a deprivation for such a child). This implies that 
we have a second significant underspecification in the capability approach: we 
need to specify which capabilities matter. This specification may differ for 
different areas in life (e.g. politically relevant capabilities versus capabilities that 
are more comprehensively valuable), and also for different types of 
capabilitarian theories or analysis that are developed (a theory of welfare 
economics, an assessment of quality of life in one country or comparison of 
averages between countries, a theory of social justice, and so forth). 
Claim 1D: Functionings and/or capabilities are not necessarily the only 
elements of ultimate value. Other things may matter too. Capabilitarian theories 
could endorse functionings and/or capabilities as their account of ultimate value, 
but may add other elements of ultimate value, such a procedural fairness. This 
implies that the capability approach is in itself incomplete as an account of value, 
since it may have to be supplemented with other elements of value. Sen (1993; 
2002: chapter 20; 2009a: 27-28) has been a strong defender of (1D), for example 
when he argued that capabilities capture the opportunity aspect of freedom, but 
not the process aspect of freedom, which is also important and of value.  
The second major characteristic of the capabilitarian theory of ethics, is 
that it contains a weak proposition about the right: whenever one’s actions 
involve a notion of the good, one should use the theory of value spelled out in 
what has been said so far.  
 The third major characteristic of the capabilitarian theory is another 
(weak and partial) proposition about the right: there may be views of the right 
that do not refer to the good that are legitimate and can complement (1) and (2). 
However, the capability approach does not tell us what those claims about the 
right are. For example, consider the following claim: “Choosing for a dictatorship 
as the political regime to govern a country is always wrong.” This claim is a claim 
about the right, which doesn’t make reference to an account of value. A more 
specified capabilitarian theory could endorse this claim, without making 
reference to people’s functionings and capabilities to justify that claim. The 
capabilities approach as an ethical theory is thus agnostic about other aspects of 
the theory of the right. 
 
This is a first attempt at spelling out how a capabilitarian ethical theory would 
look like, and the way I have formulated it may contain confusions and needs to 
be improved. My goals here has however not been to develop and present a fully 
fleshed out and matured theory of capability ethics, but rather to illustrate that it 
is possible to give a general description of the capability approach as an 
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incomplete ethical theory, which can be specified and further developed into a 
range of theories that rely on (parts of) an ethical theory (and may or may not 
also entail non-ethical accounts, such as explanatory accounts).  Such a project 
should not only be valuable for practical philosophers, but for other theorists 
who borrow from ethics too. For example, the eminent British welfare economist 
Tony Atkinson (2008) has argued that economics should be reconsidered to be a 
moral science. If one endorses the view that the final values that welfare 
economics should target are functionings and capabilities, then one can use the 
above sketched ethical theory to develop a capabilitarian welfare economics.  
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